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SENIORITY SYSTEMS AND TITLE VII
ARTHUR J. MARINELLI*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE CURRENT RECESSION has once again focused attention on the rising
unemployment rate among minority members' of the work force. The
economic slowdown has caused many employees to join the ranks of the
unemployed. When an employee is laid off from his job it is generally
accomplished according to the employee's seniority. Seniority grants em-
ployees a preference in certain phases of their employment, based on the
relative length of time they have been employed with a company or within
a department of the company.' Unions and workers prefer seniority provi-
sions in their collective agreements3 because they limit an employer's dis-
cretion. "More than any other provisions of the collective agreement . ..
seniority affects the economic security of the individual employee covered
by its terms.'
Seniority provisions frequently work to the disadvantage of minorities
because earlier employment discrimination, prior to the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 leaves them with fewer years of service. A con-
flict is thus created between the tradition of seniority and the goals of
equal opportunity and affirmative action. The applicability of Title VII to
seniority systems and the affirmative action tools for achieving the na-
tional policy of equal opportunity will be the focus of this article.
II. BACKGROUND
Seniority provisions in collective bargaining agreements do not grant
vested property rights to employees.' Seniority provisions are the result
of negotiations and may be modified by either of the contracting parties.'
*Professor of Business Law, Ohio University; B.A., Ohio University; J.D., Ohio State
University.
I Minority groups affected include blacks, Mexican-Americans, Spanish-surnamed Americans,
and other minorities which historically have been the victims of employment discrimination.
See Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem
of Special Treatment, 61 N.W.U. L. Rev. 363 (1966).
2 See generally Comment, Artificial Seniority for Minorities as a Remedy for a Past Bias
vs. Seniority Rights of Non-Minorities, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 344, 347 n.8 (1974).
3 It has been estimated by the Bureau of National Affairs that 88% of the collective bar-
gaining agreements contain some type of seniority provision. 2 BNA CoLL. BARo. NEG. &
CoNrAcrs 75:1 (1978).
4 Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 H~Av.
L. REv. 1532, 1535 (1962).
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1976), as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1976). [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
6Vogler v. McCarthy, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1971).
7 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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As may be expected, it has been left to the courts to resolve the conflict
between the discriminatory effects of seniority and the stability and con-
tinuity it provides for the workers.'
Numerous procedural requirements must be met before an action can be
brought under Title VII. An aggrieved party must file a charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180
days of the discriminatory act, 9 and must bring suit within 90 days after
receipt of a right-to-sue-letter from the EEOC. 1 In order for a plaintiff to
obtain affirmative relief under Title VII, the court must find that the em-
ployer discriminated unlawfully against the employee"' and that the policy
in question constitutes a substantive violation of the Act. 2 The burden of
proof in a Title VII case initially rests with the plaintiff who must prove
a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.'" Once the plaintiff
has proved a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a legally acceptable basis
for the alleged discrimination.1"
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to eradicate employment
discrimination based on race, sex, national origin or religion.' The legis-
lative history of the Act demonstrated a congressional intent to assist those
minorities who have traditionally been excluded from employment. 6 While
one court has held that "the legislative history of Title VII is singularly
uninstructive on seniority rights,"'" the prevailing view among the courts is
that the legislative history is essential to an understanding of the Act.' 8
8 Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
942 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
1042 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
"International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
'
2 See e.g., McDonald v. General Mills, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24, 36-37 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
13 Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442 U.S. 405, 433-34 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
14 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431-43 (1971).
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
is See generally, Deutsch, The Jurisprudence of Affirmative Action: A Post-Realist Analysis,
65 GEO. LJ. 879, 880 (1970).
1 Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States 416 F.2d 980, 987.
Is See e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352.
[Vol. 14:2
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For example, section 703 (h) " exempts bona fide seniority systems
from liability under the Act. The legislative history behind this exemption
is particularly important in construing the term "bona fide seniority system."
The original House bill did not specifically address seniority systems.2 0 In
response to criticism of this omission, Senator Clark, majority sponsor of
the bill, presented two interpretive memoranda to the Senate.21 The first
memorandum, prepared by the Justice Department, explained that present
operating seniority systems would not be affected by the Act:
If . . . a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event
of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a
provision would not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would
be true even in the case where, owing to discrimination prior to the
effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority than
Negroes.2 2
The second memorandum, prepared by Senator Clark and Senator Case,
also indicated that Title VII would have no effect on established seniority
rights. The memorandum asserted that Title VII's effect would be pros-
pective and not retrospective. 3 Such information can hardly be called un-
instructive.
III. SENIORITY SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS V. UNITED STATES
24
An early judicial attempt to grapple with the discriminatory impact
of an employer's past hiring practices was Franks v. Bowman Transporta-
tion Co., Inc."2 In Franks, individuals who had been victims of hiring dis-
crimination sought relief in the form of retroactive seniority, to begin at
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ...
20 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963).
21 110 CONG. REc. 7207, 7212, 7216 (1964).
22 Id. at 7207.
23 The memorandum introduced by Senator Clark read as follows:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective
and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in the
past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect
the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a non-dis-
criminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in
order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or once Negroes are
hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired
earlier.
110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964).
24 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
-5 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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the date of the discriminatory act." The employer claimed that section
703 (h) of Title VII barred an award of retroactive seniority. Both the dis-
trict court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals"r agreed, citing Local 189,
United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 8 which had held
that once a seniority system was established, an employer's subsequent dis-
criminatory refusal to hire does not extinguish the seniority system's bona
fides.2 9 The Supreme Court rejected both lower courts' reasoning as "clearly
erroneous" 30 and held that section 703 (h) of the Act is only "directed
toward defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice
in instances in which the post-act operation of a seniority system is chal-
lenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the
effective date of the Act."'" The Court concluded that when an award of
retroactive seniority is necessary to restore victims of post-act discrimina-
tion to their rightful positions, such relief is appropriate. 2 Since the pre-
cise question in Franks was limited only to an appropriate remedy, the
Court did not rule on the issue of whether section 703 (h) immunizes seniori-
ty systems which perpetuate the effects of past discrimination from Title
VII liability.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States33 the
Court addressed the question left unanswered in Franks. The Court held
that a seniority system, when applied on a racially neutral basis, is valid
under section 703(h) even if the system does not provide for adjustments
in seniority for victims of pre-act discrimination. ' The Supreme Court felt
that the legislative history of Title VII indicated that Congress intended
to provide a broad exemption for seniority systems."5
Teamsters arose as a pattern or practice suit brought by the United
States Attorney General, on behalf of Negroes and Spanish-surnamed in-
dividuals, charging T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., a nationwide common carrier of
motor freight, and the Teamsters with discriminatory employment prac-
tices. 38 The complaints alleged that minorities were hired only into the
less desirable, lower paying local driving positions and were not permitted
to transfer into the higher paying long-distance positions without loss of
departmental seniority. Two groups were included in the affected class. The
261d. at 758.
27 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974).
28 416 F.2d 980.
29 495 F.2d at 417.
30 424 U.S. at 757.
32 Id. at 762.
32 Id. at 767-68.
33 431 U.S 324.
8, Id. at 353.
35 Id. at 352.
88Id. at 328.
[Vol. 14:2
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first group included those hired prior to the effective date of Title VII. The
second included those hired after that date.
The Government challenged the system, which was similar to most
others used in the trucking industry, 7 on the ground that it deterred min-
ority employees from transferring from the less desirable positions and
thereby continued the effects of prior discrimination in hiring. In re-
versing the judgments of the district court and court of appeals,3" the
Court agreed that the Government had established a pattern or practice
of hiring discrimination by the company." While the Court endorsed the
use of statistics to establish a prima facie pattern or practice under Title
VII,'0 it refused to strike down the seniority system as a violation of Title
VII," holding that section 703(h) excepts all bona fide seniority sys-
tems regardless of the impact on minorities. 2 Despite the discriminatory
impact of the company's seniority system, the Court determined, based
on the language of section 703(h) and the legislative history of Title
VII, that Congress intended to uphold such seniority systems. The Court
thus denied retroactive seniority to those employees hired prior to the
Act, but did grant retroactive seniority, applying the rationale of Franks,
to the victims of post-act discriminatory hiring practices.
Since section 703(h) provides that it is not an unlawful employ-
ment practice to treat employees differently pursuant to a "bona fide"
seniority system, 3 the Court was required to define the term "bona fide."
The Teamsters Court defined "bona fide" broadly to include any seniority
system which is neutral on its face and which does not have its "genesis in
racial discrimination."" The Court held that the "bona fide" seniority sys-
tem exemption applies only if the seniority system affects minority and non-
minority employees equally and is negotiated in a nondiscriminatory atmos-
phere." If the seniority system meets these two qualifications it remains
bona fide regardless of the disparate impact resulting from its operation."
However, as Justice Stewart explained in a footnote, a seniority system has
its genesis in discrimination (and thus fails the second part of the test)
"if an intent to discriminate entered into its very adoption.""7 The Court
37 ld. at 356.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 357.
4 0d. at 334-43. See Note, The Role of Statistical Evidence in Title VII Cases, 19 B.C. L.
REv. 881 (1978); McGuire, The Use of Statistics in Title VII Cases, 30 LAB. L.J. 361
(1979).
41431 U.S. at 352-54.
42 Id.
4342 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
4431 U.S. at 355-56.
45 1d.
40 Id.
47 Id. at 346 n.28.
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mentioned some factors that should be considered in determining whether
a system is bona fide: whether the system applies equally to all employees,
whether departmental rosters are traditional in the industry, whether there
is conformity to National Labor Relations Board precedents, and whether
the system is maintained without a discriminatory purpose.
The Supreme Court in Teamsters established a narrow approach as
to what factors serve to destroy the bona fides of a system, thereby over-
turning a long series of lower court decisions based on Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc."8 Where Quarles and its progeny had focused on the discrimi-
natory impact of a departmental seniority system, lower courts are now
simply considering the neutrality of the seniority system's terms."9 In James
v. Stockham Valves and Fittings Co.,50 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
constructed a test based on the four factors it felt the Teamsters Court re-
lied upon. The four part test is:
1) whether the seniority system operates to discourage all employ-
ees equally from transferring between seniority units;
2) whether seniority units are in the same or separate bargaining
units (if the latter, whether that structure is rational and in
conformance with industry practice);
3) whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial discrimi-
nation; and
4) whether the system was negotiated and has been maintained free
from any illegal purpose.9'
The Stockham Valve court interpreted the Teamsters case narrowly and
found a number of factors that distinguished the seniority system before
it from the Teamsters system. The court pointed out that the system at Stock-
ham was created in 1949 when racial segregation was a standing procedure in
the South, and that the seniority units did not embrace bargaining units
for NLRB purposes nor did they conform to industry practice. Where a
seniority system has had its genesis in race discrimination, courts have
closely followed the Teamsters rule and held that the system is not pro-
tected by section 703 (h) since it is not bona fide."
Even before the question of bona fides is addressed a court must de-
termine whether the particular practice before it constitutes a seniority
system under the Act. In Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, In-
ternational Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,5" a job
preference bidding system allowed employees to compete for any job in
48 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
49 Crokes v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
50 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
51 Id. at 352.
5 2 Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 454 F. Supp. 158 (D. Kan. 1978).
53 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 14:2
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the plant by filling out a preference card. The system gave priority to those
who had experience in a particular occupation and thus its impact was
to exclude a disproportionate number of blacks. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals felt that such job equity procedures come within the protection
of section 703(h). The Fifth Circuit, however, in Parson v. Kaiser Alumi-
num & Chemical Corp.," struck down a ten-day bottom entry requirement
that had a discriminatory impact, holding that the probationary period was
not protected by section 703(h) and the employer would have to defend
the policy under the business necessity doctrine as to safety and efficiency.
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a forty-five week trial period was
not protected under Teamsters" because it was not a seniority system.
The Teamsters decision applies to areas of civil rights law beyond
Title VII. In United States v. East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc.,5"
the Fifth Circuit held that a seniority system valid under Title VH can-
not be invalidated by Executive Order 11246.11 Another basis for challeng-
ing seniority systems is section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,5
which requires that all persons shall enjoy the same rights as white citizens.
In Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.," the Fourth Circuit held that a
bona fide seniority system exempted under Title VII is also exempted
under section 1981. The Fifth Circuit, in a footnote in Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 0 agreed that where a challenged seniority system is
racially neutral, it is beyond the scope of section 1981. However, section
1981 may still be used in some circuits to attack seniority systems. The
Third Circuit in Bolder v. Pennsylvania State Police' indicated via dictum
that Title VII and section 1981 provide overlapping remedies against dis-
crimination.
IV: VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA V. WEBER
62
The Teamsters decision was a major setback to those wishing to chal-
lenge existing seniority systems. On the other hand, the very foundation
54575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978).
5 5 Bryant v. California Brewers Assn, 585 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978).
56 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
57 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974) reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) implemented, 41 C.F.R. 869
(1978).
58 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides in pertinent part:
All persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other.
89 575 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1978).
60576 F.2d 1157, 1191 n.37 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
01578 F.2d 912 (3rd Cir. 1978).
62443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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of labor-management relations would have been undermined had the Su-
preme Court decided otherwise, since the stability of seniority expectations
has been a traditional union strength. To avoid such an effect, probably,
the Supreme Court blocked one avenue for achieving equal opportunity.
Voluntary affirmative action, however, remains a viable alternative for
achieving the national goal of equal opportunity.6" Voluntary affirmative
action provides both the employer and the union with the opportunity to
eliminate discrimination and its effects.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber the United States Supreme
Court offered broad freedom to employers to take steps necessary to elimi-
nate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories.6 '
The Court held that the voluntary implementation of an affirmative action
plan by an employer and union, even absent any judicial determination of
employment discrimination, did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964."6 The Court described the program at issue, the Kaiser plan, as
one designed to abolish "traditional patterns of racial segregation"'66 and
"to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in the Kaiser's then almost
exclusively white craft work forces." '
Brian Weber, a white production employee with more seniority than
some black workers selected, was denied admission to an employee training
program because of a quota agreement. He instituted a class action suit
alleging that Kaiser and the union unlawfully discriminated against him on
the basis of race. The quota agreement was based on the seniority system
incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement between Kaiser Alumi-
num and Chemical Corporation and the United Steelworkers of America.
The plan required dual seniority lists so that for each of two training
vacancies, one black and one white employee would be selected on the
basis of seniority within the respective racial group. The plan was to con-
tinue until the percentage of black skilled craft workers in the Gramercy,
Louisiana plant approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force 8
Blacks had long been excluded from craft unions 9 and Kaiser's policy
was to only hire craft workers who had prior experience. Only five out of
273 skilled workers (1.83%) at the Gramercy plant were black, even
GsSee e.g., Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 952-54 (1978), Ely, The Con-
stitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CI. L. REv. 723 (1974).
443 U.S. at 198.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 200.
67 ld. at 198.
as ld.
69 The Supreme Court took judicial notice of the exclusion of blacks from the crafts on
racial grounds. Id. at 198, n.1,
[Vol. 14:2
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though the work force in the Gramercy area was approximately 39%
black.10 This significant statistical disparity was undoubtedly a result of
the historical discrimination against blacks by the building trades that de-
nied them the opportunity to get the necessary training and experience."'
The company was aware of the severe underrepresentation of minorities
in the skilled craft positions."2 Kaiser and the Steelworkers negotiated the
labor agreement at issue in Weber to avoid possible Title VII actions brought
by either the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or by black em-
ployees alleging discrimination in craft employment."3 Kaiser was also con-
cerned about possible federal sanctions imposed by the Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance (OFCC) for failure to meet its affirmative action obligations
as a government contractor under Executive Order 11246." The parties
to the labor agreement entered into a "Memorandum of Understanding"
which established a goal of 39% minority representation in the craft posi-
tions at the Gramercy plant.' The labor agreement provided for new on-
the-job training programs for which prior experience would not be a re-
quirement." Under the agreement's dual seniority selection provisions,
some black employees were admitted to the craft training programs with
less plant seniority than their white counterparts. 7
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-two decision and speaking through
Justice Brennan, found the affirmative action plan permissible.8 The Court,
following traditional patterns of judicial self-restraint, found it unnecessary
to
define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and im-
permissible affirmative action plans. It suffices to hold that the chal-
lenged Kaiser - USWA affirmative action plan falls on the permissible
side of the line.'
The case did not involve state action, and hence did not present a possible
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision was limited to what the Court described as "the narrow
To ld. at 198.
71 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp, 563 F.2d 216, 224 n.13 (5th Cir. 1977).
72 Id. at 228.
73 Id. at 229.
74 d. at 229. Executive Order 11246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976), implemented, 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Executive Order].
T5 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. La. 1976).
TO Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amincus Curiae at 8. These programs were similar to a provision in the 1974 nationwide steel
industry consent decree to which the steelworkers union was a party. See United States v.
Allegneny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 880 n.87 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976).
17 443 U.S. 193, 198.
78 ld. at 193.
TO Id. at 216.
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statutory issue of whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions
from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans."8 That
narrow issue is nonetheless difficult because it brings into direct conflict two
separately justifiable judicial constructions of Title VII. On the one hand,
Title VII has been held to prohibit not only blatant discrimination, but
also those neutral practices which perpetuate the status quo resulting from
prior discrimination."' On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held
that Title VII protects whites as well as minorities by using "any individual"
in section 703(a). 2
Justice Brennan acknowledged that under a literal interpretation of
sections 703(a) and (d) of the Civil Rights Act, Weber's position "is not
without force"8 " since McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co. for-
bids discrimination against whites as well as blacks.8 ' However, the majority
characterized Weber's reliance on McDonald and on a literal construction
of sections 703 (a) and (d) as "misplaced"8 since the plan is an affirmative
action plan voluntarily adopted by private parties to eliminate traditional
patterns of racial segregation." ' Justice Brennan felt that the legislative
history and the historical context of the Act indicate that "Congress did
not intend wholly to prohibit private and voluntary affirmative action ef-
forts as one method of solving this problem."' Clearly the majority of the
Court was motivated by an unwillingness to strike down private agreements
that would open up job opportunities for minorities.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion emphasized the practical prob-
lems of administering Title VII and the need for such voluntary agree-
ments:
I believe that additional considerations, practical and equitable, only
partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress support
the conclusion reached by the Court today."88
80 Id. at 212.
81 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424.
82 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
83 443 U.S. at 212.
84 427 U.S. at 273.
85 443 U.S. at 212.
88 Id.
87 Id. at 203. Justice Brennan quotes from the House Report accompanying the Civil Rights
Report as follows:
"No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and consequences of
racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. There is reason to believe,
however, that national leadership provided by the enactment of Federal legislation
dealing with the most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to
voluntary or local resolution of other forms of discrimination." H.R. Rep. No. 914,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), at 18, U.S. Code & Admin. News 1964, pp. 2355, 2393
(Emphasis supplied.).
d.
88 443 U.S. at 209.
[Vol. 14:2
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Blackmun pointed out that if Title VII were read literally, the union and
the employer would be liable for past discrimination against blacks and
equally liable to whites for voluntary preferences given blacks. Quoting
from Judge Wisdom's dissent in the Court of Appeals, Blackmun con-
cluded that this anomaly places employers and unions on a "high tight-
rope without a net beneath them."89
The majority of the Court rejects any interpretation which would
violate the purpose of the statute. Brennan quotes from Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States that it is a "familiar rule, that a thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of is makers."9 Brennan found Weber's
proposed inerpretation of the Act unacceptable because it would prohibit
private firms from opening to blacks, jobs from which they were barred
in the past. He said:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who had been "excluded from the American dream for so
long." 110 Cong. Rec. at 6552 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) constituted
the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious
efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hier-
archy.'
Justice Brennan also found justification for his position in the language
and legislative history of section 703 (j) of Title VII which provides that
nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted to require any employer to grant
any preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of a
racial imbalance in an employer's work force. He urged that Congress'
use of "require" rather than "require or permit" shows that Congress did
not intend to "prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action."" He also found
further support in the fact that Title VII was approved by legislators who
had traditionally resisted federal regulation of private business only upon
the condition that "management prerogatives and union freedoms ...be
left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible."9 "
The Court did place certain limitations on employers and unions,
but these are not terribly restrictive under the ad hoc approach adopted
by the Court. The plan, Justice Brennan noted, "does not necessarily tram-
mel the interests of the white employees."" The plan does not require
8 9 1 d. at 210, quoting from 562 F.2d at 230.
90 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
9' 443 U.S. at 204.
92 Id. at 206.
93 Id. quoting H.Ri REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, at 29, reprinted in [1964]
U.S. CONG. & AD. NEws 2391.
4 443 U.S. at 208.
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the discharge of white workers, nor does it absolutely bar the advancement
of white employees; it is but a temporary measure to be discontinued
once the percentage of black skilled workers approximates the percentage
of blacks in the local labor force. A plan that does those things that the Court
was so careful to note were not done by the Kaiser plan, would apparently
be unacceptable.
Justice Rehnquist's lengthy dissent identifies the most troublesome
aspects of the Court's treatment of the language and legislative history of
the Act:
Thus, by a tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale,
Holmes and Hughes, but of escape artists such as Houdini, the Court
eludes clear statutory language, "uncontradicted" legislative history,
and uniform precedent in concluding that employers are, after all,
permitted to consider race in making employment decisions.95
Quoting at length from the legislative history and debates Justice Rehn-
quist argued that quotas were not permitted by Title VII. Rehnquist also
attacked the majority reading of section 703 (j) by pointing out that "not
once during the 83 days of debate in the Senate did a speaker, proponent
or opponent, suggest that the bill would allow employers voluntarily to
prefer racial minorities over white persons." 6 Rehnquist also took issue
with the majority opinion's characterization of Kaiser's plan as voluntary
when Kaiser was pressured by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
to adopt it."7 Rehnquist's historical analysis is persuasive and consistent with
the literal language of the Act. It fails, however, to deal with the practical
discriminatory effects likely to result from its application.
The practical effects of the majority decision are difficult to predict.
Brennan's opinion lacks the clarity and candor that might have provided
a basis for determining the real limits of the rule it propounds. The Court's
emphasis on the legislative history of Title VII and the economic plight
of blacks suggests that the preferences given to blacks might be distinguish-
able from those given to other protected groups, such as women or His-
panics. Thus although the Weber opinion speaks of traditionally segregated
job categories, voluntary preference programs in favor of other minority
groups might not receive the judicial protection of the Weber doctrine.
The Court's repeated emphasis on the voluntary nature of the Kaiser
plan gives rise to an issue which the Court is sure to face in the future:
Whether an involuntary plan is beyond the protection of Weber? There is
little to prevent the Office of Federal Contract Compliance or the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission from reading the Weber opinion as
95 Id. at 222.
9O Id. at 244.
7 Id. at 246.
[Vol. 14:2
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a blanket endorsement of affirmative action. This interpretation could lead
to pressures on employers to implement discriminatory quotas. The EEOC
has maintained that employers must comply with Title VII without awaiting
agency or judicial action and should take voluntary affirmative action, in-
cluding preferential treatment of minorities. 8 The outcome of a case may
depend on a factual determination as to whether the plan is voluntary
or involuntary. The disagreement between Brennan and Rehnquist in Weber
illustrates that reasonable minds can differ as to whether a plan is voluntary
or involuntary. The Kaiser plan was the result of collective bargaining and
the Court relied heavily on that fact in determining that the plan was
voluntary.
It must also be noted that the employee's seniority rights were not
affected by the collective bargaining agreement because, "the craft training
program is new and does not involve an abrogation of pre-existing rights."9
Such a limitation, preventing the abrogation of existing seniority rights,
may well prove to be significant to both union and employer in future col-
lective bargaining plans which incorporate affirmative action provisions.
In affirming the validity of racial quotas, the Weber Court has ex-
posed itself to the charge of usurping the legislative function of the Con-
gress. 1 °0 The Weber ruling does serve to assist employers and unions in es-
tablishing affirmative action plans without undue fear of discrimination
suits in the federal courts. Whether private parties can be compelled to
develop and adopt affirmative action plans in the absence of proven past
discrimination remains to be seen. Joint efforts by union and management
to improve minority work opportunities have now been given clear Court
approval.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Teamsters decision closed one avenue, the Weber decision
kept another one open to reach the goals established by Title VII. The
self-corrective plan implemented in Weber is a reasonable one. Such agree-
ments between employers and unions are necessary if discrimination in
employment is to be eliminated.
With the Supreme Court's recognition of the right of the employer
and union to modify seniority standings through collective bargaining agree-
ments, it has opened the door to voluntary changes in seniority status of
employees. Since unions have the responsibility to represent the rights of
98 44 Fed. Reg. 4422 (1979); see generally Note, Title VII and Preferential Treatment: A
Response to EEOC Affirmative Action Guidelines, 67 GEo. L.J. 855, 862 (1979), U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT - A GUIDEBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS 12-13 (1964).
90 443- U.S.--at 215 (Justice- Btackmanis concurring opinion).-
100 See Chief Justice Burger's dissent, 443 U.S. at 216.
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all employees fairly,"' the minority employee may be able to require his
union to negotiate for affirmative action changes in the employeres seniority
system.
Voluntary plans can overcome the perpetuation of pre-Act discrimi-
nation. Exactly what responsibility unions have in pursuing voluntary pro-
grams in accordance with their duty of fair representation is now uncertain.
Only years of litigation in the area of seniority rights will define the full
reach of the Teamsters and Weber decisions.
101 See e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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